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THE ADEQUACY OF STATE INSURANCE RATE 
REGULATION: THE McCARRAN-FERGUSON ACT IN 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVEt 
Spencer L. Kimball* and Ronald N. Boyce** 
A NY substantial inquiry into the functioning of the insurance commissioner in American society poses the question, at the 
threshold of the inquiry, whether state regulatory power over 
the insurance business is likely to continue, or whether insurance 
will fall increasingly under the aegis of the federal government. 
This article seeks to ascertain the minimum conditions for the 
permanent preservation of state regulatory power over the insur-
ance business, and to determine whether they are now satisfied. 
These conditions may be summarily stated: the Congress of the 
United States has shmm its willingness to apply federal antitn1st 
and marketing legislation to the insurance business, to the extent 
that the states do not regulate. Application of such statutes would 
have destructive impact on the present structure of the insurance 
business. Even more important, it seems possible that once the 
federal government entered the field of insurance regulation, 
the scope of its intervention might increase until it occupied 
the field. Though rate regulation has been one of the lesser func-
tions of the state insurance commissioner, federal concern with 
combinations of insurers to fix premium rates has now made ade-
quate state regulation of rate making pivotal for the preservation 
of state control over insurance. Unless the commissioner is able 
to perform his statutory duty of regulating rates well enough to 
prevent effective pressures for federal regulation, he may cease 
to have any role to play in our society. 
THE FUNCTION OF RATE MAKING AND RATE REGULATION 
In its nature, insurance is a mutual enterprise. Basically it 
is a scheme by which the individual's insurable risks are distrib-
tThe authors gratefully acknowledge a grant from the University of Utah Research 
Fund which made this project possible. The material on Wisconsin law was obtained 
at the University of Wisconsin under a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. 
•Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-'Ed. 
••Member of the Utah Bar.-Ed. 
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uted among a large group of persons, each policyholder making a 
contribution in the form of an advance premium or a post hoc 
assessment toward the totality of losses incurred by the group. 
The nature and internal operation of the corporate ( or other) 
structure of the enterprise must be subjected to legal control, 
to the end that reasonable expectations of policyholders be not 
frustrated. So also the adequacy of the rate structure must be 
assured, for if the insurance fund is not large enough to pay 
losses, the scheme does not give protection. The essentially co-
operative character of the insurance business, even when organ-
ized for private profit, gives both the policyholder and 
company a stake in the long-run adequacy of insurance premi-
ums.1 In mutual or non-profit companies, the policyholder has 
little legitimate concern to set maximum premiums, for dividends 
restore overpayments to him. In nonparticipating stock compa-
nies, however, overpayments are profits, and policyholders, who 
do not participate in them, have an interest in making sure 
that premiums are not excessive. In both kinds of company, 
policyholders have an interest in seeing that the rate structure 
is not unreasonably discriminatory. 
The adequacy of rates is basic to the very existence of the 
insurance institution; the prevention of excessive or discrim-
inatory rates goes to the fairness of marketing practices. Rate 
regulation seeks to bring the rate structure of the business 
under public control for the achievement of the twin objectives 
of adequacy of the insurance fund and fairness of premium 
charges. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF RATE REGULATION 
As a feature of the commissioner's activity, rate regulation 
is of recent origin. Patterson described it in 1927 as "embryon-
ic" ;2 even after thirty more years it is still much less sophisticated 
and thorough than public utility rate regulation.3 Perhaps in-
surance rate regulation has developed slowly because of the 
high degree of competition prevalent in the industry. Capital 
1 Even stock insurance company men insist on "·the essential mutuality of all in-
surance." See ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' AssoCIATION OF THE NORTHWEST 
29, 32 (1896). In the short-run, capital and surplus requirements may ensure that a tem-
porary inadequacy of premiums will not destroy a stock company. 
2 PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 268 (1927). 
3 In 1955, Patterson said it was still "one of the least effective phases of insurance 
regulation." CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE, 3d ed., 43 (1955). 
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and surplus requirements for stock companies, and assessability 
of policyholders for mutuals, gave some assurance that inade-
quacy of the fund be not a disaster. Though inadequate rates 
constitute a graver danger to the insuring public than excessive 
or discriminatory ones, a high degree of sophistication about 
insurance must precede control to insure adequacy of rates. 
Thus a high level of competition, which kept premiums from 
being grossly excessive, forestalled effective regulation until well 
into the twentieth century, even though there were many periods 
in insurance history when rates were inadequate. An 1839 corpo-
rate charter expressed the attitude of the whole nineteenth cen-
tury; it authorized the company to charge "such premium or 
consideration . . . as may be agreed on between the said corpo-
ration and the party or parties agreeing with them."4 
Historically, fire insurance losses seemed to follow cyclical 
patterns. When the loss ratio was low and profits high, the pros-
pect of large profits attracted newcomers to the insurance busi-
ness. 5 Companies were easy to start; neither experience nor 
elaborate physical plant were essential. A rented office, a few 
clerks, some solicitors on straight commission, and the capital 
fund required by statute, were all that was necessary. Unsophisti-
cated early fire insurance rating put flat rates of perhaps $1 per 
$100 on brick construction, and $2 per $100 on frame. Later, 
agents and field men made inspections and worked out a rough 
rating schedule, but only in the last third of the nineteenth 
century did a scientific rating plan supported by statistics begin 
to develop.6 Premium volume might be enormous in relation 
to capital, and a new company might easily enjoy the illusion 
of large profits if its accounting practices did not provide for 
adequate reinsurance reserves, for income in the expansive phase 
of the business greatly exceeded outgo, even if the business 
were actuarially insolvent.7 Hence overconfident underwriting 
with rates driven down to uneconomic levels by exessive com-
petition might go undetected until a catastrophic fire wiped 
weak companies out of existence with great loss to policyholders. 
In 1877 the president of the Fire Underwriters' Association of 
4 Wis. Laws 1838-1839, No. 36. 
5 BREARLEY, THE HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL :BOARD OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS 9-10, 285-
286 (1916) [hereinafter cited as BREARLEY]. 
6 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FIRE INS. INVESTIGATING COMM. REP. 38 (1913). 
7 This illusion was recognized in SIXTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' 
AssN. OF N.W. 130-131 (1875); see also id. at 200. 
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the Northwest stated that about 4000 insurance companies had 
come into existence at one time or another, and that only I 000 
remained.8 An industry committee reporting in 1850 alleged 
that from the beginning to 1810 the fire insurance business was 
profitable, that from 1811 to 1830 it produced an average profit of 
about three percent on capital investment, while during the years 
from 1831 to 1850 the entire business was carried on at a great 
loss of capital. The committee said there was a loss for the entire 
period from 1791 to 1850.9 Whether these statements were ac-
curate or not, they represented industry belief, and explain the 
insurance fraternity's attitude toward price fixing combinations.10 
Faced with periodic threats to the integrity and profitableness 
of their business, insurance men sought to rationalize the making 
of rates. As early as 1806 companies made informal agreements 
on rates,11 and by 1819 there were local boards whose members 
undertook not to depart from established premium rates.12 Not 
until after the Civil War were rate-fixing combinations effec-
tive, however. In 1865 and 1866 losses skyrocketed and a felt 
need to end chaotic competition resulted in the 1866 organiza-
tion of The National Board of Fire Underwriters. The board's 
objective was "to establish and maintain, as far as practicable, a 
system of uniform rates of premium." But the habit of decades 
of uncontrolled competition was not so easily broken, and within 
five years the board became virtually moribund under pressure 
of relentless competitive forces. Perhaps rationalization of the 
industry would have been delayed indefinitely had it not been 
for the Chicago and Boston fires of 1871 and 1872. Scores of 
companies went , to the wall in the aftermath of these catastro-
phes and out of them came real impetus for the formation of rate 
making combinations. Although competitive forces continually 
reasserted themselves, concerted rate making was thereafter the 
normal pattern. The National Board immediately revived. Re-
gional and state, and even city, boards were organized, all directed 
to the restraint of anarchic competition.13 
SEIGHTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' AssN. OF N.W. 17 (1877). 
9 BREARLEY, 284-286. 
10 Insurance men saw the board, not as a monopoly, but merely as an association for 
statistical purposes. See TucKETT's MONTHLY INSURANCE JOURNAL, July 1852, as quoted in 
BREARLEY, 287. 
11 Id. at 283. 
12 The Salamander Society was founded in New York City in 1819. Id. at 249. WANDEL, 
THE CONTROL OF COMPETITION IN FIRE INSURANCE 15 (1935) [hereinafter cited as WANDEL]. 
13 BREARLEY, 1-50. See WANDEL, 15-32, for a detailed statement of organizations. 
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Difficulties with the enforcement of concerted rate making 
led to constant effort to develop new methods. National con-
cert broke down and was replaced by regional organizations 
in the 1880's. The National Board shifted its attention to fire 
prevention and insurance statistics, though it still exercised per-
suasive influence to help maintain the local rating organizations.14 
In the 1880's the compact system developed, with heightenea 
emphasis on the locality as the scene for agreements among local 
agents to respect the rates set by compact managers.15 Since the 
commission method of compensating soliciting agents made com-
petition felt most keenly at the local level, it was at the local 
level that restraint could be most effectively exercised. The com-
pact system was effective enough to call forth anti-compact leg-
islation in various states.16 
Companies frequently circumvented the anti-compact laws, 
especially by promulgation of advisory rates. For example, when 
the 1895 Missouri legislature amended the antitrust statute to 
apply to insurance companies, the salaried rate maker of the 
Association of Fire Underwriters of Missouri wrote to all com-
panies doing business in the state that he was entering the busi-
ness of selling rate books. The companies bought the rate serv-
ice, and local agents formed informal, confidential clubs whose 
objectives were to ensure "correct practices" in the underwriting 
of fire risks. Little was put in writing and only when disaffected 
members informed on their colleagues was there reliable in-
formation about these combinations. The scheme was effective, 
but in Missouri, at least, prosecution was eventually successful 
and seventy-three insurance companies were ousted in quo war-
ranto proceedings.17 
The ,boards were also concerned with fire prevention and control, through fire departments 
and laws regulating construction. BREARLEY, 39-47. 
14 BREARLEY, 63-64, 72-73, 78, 84; WANDEL, 16. 
15 WANDEL, 51; FOURTEENTJi ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF FIRE UNDERWRITERS' AssN. OF 
THE N.W. 49 (1883); WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE FIRE INS. INVESTIGATING COMM. R.EP. 38 (1913). 
16 An unsuccessful bill was introduced in Michigan in 1883, and bills became law 
in New Hampshire and Ohio in 1885, in -Michigan in 1887, and in many other states there-
after. N.H. Laws 1885, c. 93; Ohio Laws 1885, p. 231; Mich. Laws 1887, No. 285. BREARLEY, 
76; WANDEL, 125; United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 555, n. 
43 (1944). The vulnerability of insurance to more powerful opposing business interests 
was strikingly shown here, for the furniture manufacturers of Grand Rapids were said 
to be ,behind the anti-compact law in -Michigan. BREARLEY, 76, 289. 
17 In St. Joseph, Missouri, the association was called the "Underwriters' Social Club" 
but the Supreme Court of Missouri was not convinced that the purposes were social: 
"In order that [the secretary] might not become lonesome in the dub rooms ••• , and 
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Even in states where anti-compact sentiment did not at first 
produce restrictive legislation, there was a pervasive undercur-
rent of such feeling. Brearley counted four laws and two bills 
in the 1880's, eleven laws and twenty-nine bills in the 1890's, and 
five laws and sixty-six bills in the first decade of the new cen-
tury. By 1912, twenty-three states had enacted such laws.18 
Though enforcement was spotty, some states attempted rigorous 
house cleaning.19 
The Wisconsin story shows the pervasive character of the 
anti-compact sentiment. In 1887 Governor Rusk20 mildly casti-
gated the "growing tendency of insurance companies to com-
bine in fixing the rates of insurance. . . ."21 An anti-compact 
bill was unsuccessfully introduced in the legislature.22 A legis-
lator started to draft a bill to create a state fire insurance company, 
but quickly abandoned it.23 In 1889 two bills were introduced 
and made some progress; one was "A bill to prevent combina-
tions and 'insurance trusts' in the state of Wisconsin," while 
the other would have appointed an assistant insurance commis-
sioner in each locality to fix rates.24 There were at least thirteen 
more anti-combination bills in the next two decades. One bill 
became law and forbade combinations to fix prices, except that 
local associations of insurance agents were explicitly authorized 
just to be social, each of the local agents of the defendant companies sent him their daily 
reports, • . . and just to be social •he examined each report and . . . compared the 
rates specified in each policy with the Fetter rates, and if there was a variance put a 
slip on the report calling attention of the general agent of the company to the 
variance .•.. " Later even that much writing was dispensed with in an unsuccessful at-
tempt to evade prosecution. State ex inf. Crow v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 152 Mo. 1 
at 35-36, 52 S.W. 595 (1899). See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343 at 390, 
94 S. 7 (1922), for a history of Mississippi Inspection and Advisory Rating Bureau, which 
sought to escape the anti-compact law by removing the form of compulsion from the 
organization. The effort proved very costly to the companies. See also WANDEL, 127-133, 
for a discussion of the ways of meeting this unfriendly legislation. 
18 BREARLEY, 291. There were also some repealer bills. Id. at 291-292. United States v. 
Soutlleastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 555, n. 43 (1944). 
19 In 1900, for example, nearly a hundred companies paid $1000 fines to Missouri. 
BREARLEY, 295. Even more striking is the levy of $8,000,000 in penalties against fire 
insurance companies ,by 'Mississippi. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Robertson, 131 Miss. 343 at 493, 
~4 s. 7 (1922). 
20 Later first United States Secretary of Agriculture. RANEY, W1scoNsIN, A STORY OF 
.PROGRESS 271 (1940). 
21 Wis. A. J. 25 (1887). 
22 A. 844, Wis. (1887) (assembly bill). 
23 On back of MS. bill A. 684, Wis. (1887). 
24 A. 695, A. 694, Wis. (1889). 
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to fix rates.25 Notwithstanding its persistence, the oppos1t1on 
to insurance rate fixing was mild; despite Populism in the 189O's 
and the rise of Progressivism as a potent political force at the 
turn of the century there was no serious talk of insurance rate 
regulation in Wisconsin until 1911. 
Anti-compact laws provided much too facile a solution to a 
very complicated problem. Uncontrolled competition had recur-
rently proved disastrous to policy holders; the latter had much 
at stake in the adequacy of premiums. Some states recognized 
the danger of demoralizing rate wars by coupling prohibition 
of compacts with denunciation of engaging in rate wars.26 Nor 
did anti-compact laws truly restore free and open competition27 
Regulation of insurance rates was a more sophisticated solu-
tion. It permitted concerted rate making but brought it under 
social control. The pressures for the creation of rate setting bu-
reaus were deeply rooted in the basic needs of the business, and 
could not be denied. Before the turn of the century the idea of 
regulation was already being discussed.28 Early in the twentieth 
century, insurance rate regulation began.29 
Kansas was early with a statute in 1909; it gave power to 
the insurance commissioner to see that rates were adequate but 
not excessive, and it also forbade discrimination against or in 
favor of individuals, but did not deal with discriminatory clas-
sification.30 Litigation arising out of this act tested and established 
the constitutionality of state rate regulation. The United States 
Supreme Court held that insurance was affected with a sufficient 
public interest for the state to control its price.31 
In the following decades many other states enacted rate regu-
latory statutes, usually authorizing the formation of private rating 
bureaus but controlling their practices.32 By 1944, only three 
states had no social control of rate making. 
Control was of two kinds. Some statutes reflected the earlier, 
25 Wis. Laws, 1897, c. 356. 
26 PATIERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 273 (1927). 
27 See, e.g., PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS 
20 (1915). 
• 28 A. 694, Wis. (1889) would have provided for rate setting by assistant insurance 
commissioners located in each municipality, while A. 376, §6, Wis. (1899) would have set 
up an ex officio state board to set rates for accident insurance. 
29 See WANDEL, 134. 
30 Kan. Laws, 1909, c. 152. 
31 German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389 (1914). 
32 PATIERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES 274 (1927). 
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somewhat naive, simple opposition to rate making combinations, 
while others reflected the more sophisticated recognition of the 
need for concert under social control. Twelve states had no ex-
plicit rate regulatory statutes, but only anti-combination pro-
visions. Four of these anti-combination provisions were directed 
specifically at insurance, while the other eight were general anti-
monopoly provisions in statutes or state constitutions. Fourteen 
states had anti-compact provisions directed specifically to insur-
ance, and forbidding combinations except as authorized by cog-
nate rate regulatory statutes. Fifteen states had general anti-mon-
opoly statutes or constitutional provisions and !1lso rate regula-
tory statutes. Four states had only rate regulatory provisions. 
Thus in 1944 fifteen states either had no control over insurance 
rates, or the unsophisticated anti-monopoly provisions which did 
not regulate rate making but rather sought to preserve compe-
tition. In the other thirty-three states there was rate regulatory 
machinery, usually coupled with anti-monopoly provisions.33 The 
effectiveness of control varied from purely paper machinery in 
some states to relatively complete and effective control in others 
like New York, and direct state rate making in Texas.34 Even in 
states with fairly effective control in leading lines of insurance 
like fire and workmen's compensation, the control was relatively 
ineffective or altogether lacking in other lines.35 It might be a 
reasonably accurate generalization to say that in 1944, though 
ostensibly there was control in two-thirds of the states, insurance 
rate making was as yet largely uncontrolled in the United States.36 
33 T:he above classification and count is from note, 33 GEo. L. J. 70 (1944); a some-
what different classification and count is to be found in Brief for the United States 
130-131, United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944). No con-
clusions reached nere would be affected by the diversity. See also Brief for Appellees 51-52. 
And see Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary 
on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 55-57 (1943). 
34See Marryott, "Mutual Insurance under Rate Regulation," 15 I.Aw AND CoNTEM. 
PROB. 540 at 558 (1950), for automobile rates in New York, and see Tex. Stat. (Vernon, 
1936) art. 4878 et seq. 
35 Moser, "Operation of Independents Under the Rate Regulatory Pattern," 15 I.Aw 
AND CONTEM. PROB. 523 at 526 (1950). 
36 See, e.g., l RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 216 (1952). The Department of Justice 
studied regulation in the 43 states having rating bureaus in 1944, and thought that half 
of the states left the public "virtually at the mercy of the combinations of fire-insurance 
companies which fix and maintain :the rates to be charged by their members." Joint 
Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362, H.R. 
3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 55-57 (1943). And see id. at 102, when Attorney-
General McKittrick of Missouri alleged that none of the 18 states within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Western Underwriters' Association had been successful in controlling 
the ·business in the public interest. But see id. at 124. 
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THE SOUTHEASTERN UNDERWRITERS CASE AND ITS .AFTERMATH 
From 1868 to 1944 it was generally assumed that insurance 
was not commerce, and was not subject to federal regulation.87 
An elaborate structure of state supervision might depend on this 
assumption, for if insurance were subject to federal regulation, 
broadly phrased federal statutes like the Sherman, Clayton, and 
Federal Trade Commission Acts would be applicable to insur-
ance, conflicting statutes of the states would be invalid, and still 
other state statutes might conceivably fall as undue burdens on 
interstate commerce. However, all of the cases treating insurance 
as outside of commerce had been concerned with the validity 
of state regulation, which the companies had vigorously fought 
until the imminence of federal control made state regulation the 
lesser of two evils.88 Since such regulation might be valid even if 
insurance were commerce, where the local interest was dominant 
and Congress had not acted, no cases clearly held that insurance 
was not subject to federal regulation. 
As the federal power under the commerce clause expanded 
during the 1930's, it became increasingly clear that in due time 
the complex national insurance business would be declared sub-
ject to federal control under the commerce clause.39 At an earlier 
date, when state regulation was a reality while federal regula-
tion was in abeyance, insurance men often called for federal 
regulation of insurance. Insurance companies sought relief "from 
the aggressive acts of hostile [state] legislatures."40 But as federal 
regulation neared reality desire was replaced by pervasive fear. 
In 1944 the Department of Justice prosecuted the Southeastern 
Underwriters' Association and associated companies and officials 
for violation of the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court declared 
that insurance was commerce, and that the Sherman Act forbade 
37 See United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 578 (1944). 
The notion originated with Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1868). 
38See Joint Hearing Before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary 
on S. 1362, H.R. 3269 and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 29-30, 61-62. 
39 See, e.g., id. at 545, n. 23; note, 32 GEO. L. J. 66 at 73 (1943); Orfield, "Improving 
State Regulation of Insurance," 32 MINN. L. REv. 219 at 221, n. 13 (1948); Nehemkis, 
"Paul v. Virginia: The Need .for Re-Examination," 27 GEO. L. J. 519 (1939); GAVIT, THE 
COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 333-334 (1932). Actually, it was 
already clear long before. See, e.g., Dawson, "A Case for National Supervision," 1 Moony's 
MAGAZINE 312 at 314 (1905-1906) (Dawson was one of the leading actuaries of his time). 
40 See ABA SECTION OF INSURANCE LAw PROCEEDINGS 133 (1944-1945) for summary of 
bills introduced and other serious proposals. See also 'Murphy, "Insurance Under the 
Commerce Clause," 33 IowA L. REv. 91 at 92-94 (1947); the quotation (in text above) 
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rate making combinations, and some insurance men thought the 
end of the world was come. 41 
State officials, too, feared that the entire structure of state 
insurance regulation was endangered by the decision.42 So also 
did the dissenting judges.43 This fear was exaggerated, as the 
subsequent Robertson case demonstrated. Insurance was within 
the concurrent power over commerce, and the states could con-
tinue to regulate its lo"cal aspects so long as Congress did not 
occupy the field.44 The most serious immediate danger to the 
states was that state insurance taxation might be invalidated as 
an undue burden on commerce. Companies refused payment of 
taxes to the states, and a cry went up for legislation in Congress 
to authorize continued state regulation and taxation.45 Pending 
decision of the Southeastern Underwriters case, there were un-
successful attempts to exempt insurance from all federal regula-
tion, and to validate continued state taxation and regulation.46 
In the next session of Congress after the Southeastern Under-
writers case, there was virtually unanimous agreement that the 
is from INSURANCE BLUE BooK (Centennial Issue, 1876-1877) 29-34 (c. VI, "Fire Ins. 
1860-1869"). But the Temporary National Economic Committee recommended continued, 
though strengthened, state regulation. TNEC Rep. (1938-1941) pp. 40-43, 586-587; and 
see Address of Senator O'Mahoney, 26 A.B.A.J. 907 (1940). 
41 See, e.g., editorial, THE NATIONAL UNDERWRITER, Life Ins. ed., June 9, 1944, p. I. 
For a collection of quotations on this point, see note, 23 Cm-KENT L. R.Ev. 317 at 320 
(1945). 
42 E.g., Harrington (Insurance Commissioner for Massachusetts), "An Exploration of 
the Effects of the S.E.U.A. Decision," 1944 INS. L. J. 590. 
43 United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 at 581 (1944) (C.J. 
Stone); id. at 583 CT· Frankfurter); id. at 590 G- Jackson). 
44Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946), upheld state regulation forbidding 
doing of business by unadmitted insurers or unlicensed agents. State power did not 
necessarily depend on congressional authorization through the McCarran Act. Cf. Paul 
v. Virginia, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 168 (1868). The case of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943), 
holding that the Sherman Act did not apply to an agricultural marketing combination 
operating under authority of state law, suggests that regulated rate making by bureaus 
might be valid even without congressional authorization. Note, 96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 223 
at 228 (1947). See also Guiher, "United States v. Southeastern Undenvriters' Ass'n: Its 
Impact on Existing Federal Statutes," ABA SECTION OF INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 33-37 
(1944-1945), and SAWYER, INSURANCE As INTERSTATE COMMERCE 149-150 (1945), for an 
indication .that the insurance companies had much hope for the doctrine of Parker v. 
Brown. 
45 "But this emergency is immediate and it is necessary to pass this legislation now. 
The States do not know what to do with respect to the collection of taxes and the in-
surance companies do not know what to do with respect to the payment of taxes." 91 
CONG. R.Ec. 1092 (1945). 
46S. 1362; H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess. (1943). The House bill passed the House 
of Representatives -by a vote of 283 to 54, 90 CONG. REc. 6565 (1944), before it met the 
vigorous and successful opposition of Senator O'Mahoney of Wyoming. TIME, Dec. 13, 
1943, p. 82; NEW REPUBuc, May 29, 1944, p. 378. 
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state regulatory structure and power to tax must be safeguarded 
but there were conflicting views as to how far the act should 
exempt insurance companies from existing applicable federal 
legislation. After hurried consideratiOJ! of the problem,47 Congress 
enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act,48 which declared "that the 
continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the 
business of insurance is in the public interest," and provided in 
section 2(b) that "No Act of Congress shall be construed to in-
validate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for 
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which im-
poses a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically 
relates to the business of insurance: Provided~ That after Jan-
uary I, 1948, ... the Sherman Act, ... the Clayton Act, ... [and] 
the Federal Trade Commission Act, shall be applicable to the 
business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regu-
lated by State law." 
The proviso was a compromise, prepared by a conference 
committee. It mediated between the faction in Congress that ad-
vocated complete exemption from the antitrust laws (the House 
bill) and that supporting substantial surveillance by the federal 
government (the Senate bill).49 It gave to the states the primary 
responsibility to determine and enforce public policy with re-
spect to rate making combinations, but preserved some role for 
the federal government. 
Through cooperative effort of the insurance industry and the 
state commissioners of insurance, model bills regulating rate 
making were prepared for submission to state legislatures.50 These 
"All-Industry" bills were enacted with more or less variation in 
substantially all of the states. 51 The motivation of state legislatures 
was undoubtedly mixed, combining in varying proportions the 
desire to improve the quality and scope of state regulation of 
insurance rating, the desire to enable insurance companies to 
escape the provisions of the federal statutes, and the desire to 
maintain intact state control and taxation of the insurance busi-
ness. 
47 For a fairly detailed statement of the legislative history of the McCarran Act, see 
note, 23 Cm-KENT L. REv. 317 (1945). 
48 59 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§1011-5. 
49 Senator Murdock (Utah), 91 CONG. REc. 1480-1481 (1945). 
50 See Moser, "Operation of Independents Under the Rate Regulatory Pattern," 15 
LAW AND CONT.EM. PROB. 523 at 527 (1950). 
51 By 1950 every state and territory had adopted the fire and marine bill, or the 
casualty and surety bill, or both. See 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 216-220 (1952). 
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Under this model legislation the principle of concerted rate 
making under social control was established as nation-wide policy 
at the state level, in preference to the less sophisticated prohibi-
tion-of-concert principle of the Sherman Act. 52 The act provided 
for rates to be ascertained on the basis of statistical experience, 
which should be open to the public and to the insurance com-
missioner. It provided that rates be filed by each insurer or by 
a rating organization it should select. Subscription to the rating 
bureaus was to remain open to all insurers, and operation of 
the bureaus was to be subject to state control. Finally, the rates 
themselves might be disapproved by the commissioner. if they 
were "excessive, inadequate, or unfairly discriminatory."53 This 
adds up to a stringent system of regulation, in theory at least. 
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF RATE REGULATION IN THE STATES 
The theoretically stringent system of regulation provided by· 
the "All-Industry" laws is somewhat less than uniformly stringent 
in practice. Whether the statutes are implemented or not depends 
upon the competence and attitudes of the commissioner a,nd his 
staff, the adequacy of the commissioner's budget, and the coopera-
tion of the attorney general's office, to mention only some obvious 
prerequisites. It is not possible within the compass of a single 
article to examine exhaustively the effectiveness of rate regula-
tion, and broad generalizations have limited meaning because of 
the great variation, both from state to state and from year to 
year. Nevertheless, two particular examples may provide some 
basis for judgments about the subject. 
52,But see Brief for the United States 113-116, United States v. Southeastern Under-
writers Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), where the government sought to disparage the scientific 
character of insurance rate making techniques, and contended that under present cir-
cumstances, there was no justification for any other policy than that of the Sherman Act. 
The competitive principle was not entirely abandoned; the statutes permitted independ-
ents to file rates without joining bureaus and bureau members to file percentage devia-
tions from bureau rates, ordinarily based on lower expense factors. See Kulp, "The Rate-
Making Process in Property and Casualty Insurance-Goals, Technics, and Limits," 15 LAW 
AND CoNTEM. PROB. 493 at 513-514 (1950). Brook, "Public Interest and the Commissioners' 
-All Industry Laws," 15 LAw AND CoNTElli. PROB. 606 (1950), makes a very persuasive 
case for the proposition that rate regulation is unsound. Brook thinks that free competi-
tion would prevent excessive rates, while sufficiently stringent solvency laws would prevent 
inadequate insurance rates from injuring policyholders. 
53 See Gardner, "Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws-A Problem in Synthesis," 61 
HARv. L. REv. 246 at 260-265 (1948). 
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Wisconsin 
557 
In Wisconsin the pervasive influence of Progressivism should 
have ensured a hospitable climate for the development of insur-
ance rate regulation, for regulation of railroad rates was central 
to Robert M. LaFollette's Progressive program. Nevertheless, 
serious interest in fire insurance rate regulation began rather 
late in Wisconsin. In 1911 the governor received a letter from a 
"consulting fire insurance expert in the public interest," who had 
done work for the state of Kansas, the pioneer state in insurance 
rate regulation. He sought professional employment on the 
ground that Wisconsin fire insurance rates were too high.54 
Four months later the Wisconsin legislature passed a resolution 
calling for the appointment of a joint legislative investigating 
committee to survey the entire field of fire insurance, with special 
attention to rates.55 The committee's thoughtful report proposed 
cooperative rate making under public control rather than a re-
turn to anarchic competitive practices. It urged compulsory mem-
bership in rate making bureaus for all companies.56 Despite the 
committee's careful work, the insurance companies soundly de-
feated the rate bill in 1913, and a modified bill again in 1915.57 
In 1917 a Stalwart administration introduced and passed a rate 
regulatory bill, throwing doubt on the truth of Progressive alle-
gations that the Stalwarts were entirely indifferent to the popular 
welfare.58 The law provided for compulsory membership in rat-
ing bureaus, which were made subject to control by the commis-
sioner. Membership in the bureaus had to be open, unreasonable 
54 Letter from H.B. Seely of Chicago, dated Jan. 25, 1911, on file in the Wisconsin 
Legislative Reference Library. 
55 Wis. Laws 1911, J. Res. 40; and see id., c. 512 for the powers of the committee. 
56 '\\71scONSIN LEGISLATIVE FIRE !NS. INVESTIGATING COMM. REP. (1913). 
57 A. 901, Wis. (1913); Wis. A. J. 1112-1114 (1913). S. 88, Wis. (1915). Substitute 
Amendment IS, unsuccessfully introduced by Senator Hansen, an insurance man, would 
have emasculated the bill •by removing the commissioner's ratemaking powers. The un-
amended bill passed the Senate smoothly, but the insurance companies made a successful 
stand in the Assembly. "Insurance Men Fight Rate Plan," MILWAUKEE J., May 26, 1915; 
"Fire Insurance Rates Held High," W1scoNSIN STATE J., May 26, 1915. (All Wisconsin 
newspaper clippings cited are on file in the Wisconsin Legislative Reference Library 
unless otherwise noted). After much dispute, the bill was defeated in the Assembly by a 
vote of 46 to 22, Wis. Assembly J. 1090 (1915), then reconsidered (id. at ll50) and 
finally defeated by a vote of 41 to 35 (id. at 1373). 
58 Wis. Laws 1917, c. 61. The ,bill, S. 8, Wis. (1917), was introduced by Stalwart 
Senator Bennett, at the request of Stalwart Governor Philipp and his appointee, In-
surance Commissioner Cleary. After some compromises on the terms of the bill, it passed 
both houses unanimously, Wis. S. J. 361, Wis. A. J. 639 (1917). And see, for an example 
of such charges, editorial, LAFoLLETIE's MAGAZINE, August 1916. 
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or discriminatory rates were forbidden, and the comm1ss1oner 
was empowered to order changes in rates after hearing. 
The commissioner's power of control was no dead letter;59 
under some commissioners· the regulation of fire insurance rates 
was fairly effective, but under others there was persistent public 
dissatisfaction with the adequacy of regulation. In 1929, as a 
result of conflict between mutual and stock companies over the 
control of the Wisconsin Inspection Bureau, which had filed a 
voluntary rate reduction without consulting the mutuals, an 
effort was made in the legislature to break the bureau's practical 
monopoly of fire rating. 00 The proposed legislation was not passed, 
but an investigating committee was appointed instead.61 This 
committee recommended a revised and strengthened rating law 
which was adopted in 1931.62 In 1943 another investigation was 
unsuccessfully proposed, · giving strong indication of some persis-
tence of dissatisfaction with the extent to which fire insurance 
rates were really regulated. 63 
It was in the context of persistent, even if not intense, un-
happiness about the sporadic effectiveness of rate regulation in 
Wisconsin that the "All-Industry" bill was proposed in Wis-
consin in 194 7. The commissioner took the position that the 
existing Wisconsin statutes were better. Deputy Commissioner 
Timbers drafted a bill incorporating the existing statute, extend-
59 "Denies Plea for Boost of Risk .Rates," CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 19, 1918; "Risk Con-
cerns Oppose Smith Cut in Rates," .MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, May 24, 1926; and see "Increase 
Farm Insurance .Rates," CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 9, 1926, for an increase in farm rates per-
mitted .to encourage commercial companies to write rural business. 
60 A. 298, Wis. (1929); the ·bill died after a short, tempestuous existence. See Wis. 
A. J. 1450 (1929); id. at 1533; id. at 1708; and see •~Mauthe Hits at Condition in 
Wisconsin," CAPITAL TIMES, Feb. 3, 1929; "Given No Chance to Defend It," CAPITAL 
TIMES, June 20, 1929. 
From this point on, ·this section is dependent to a substantial extent on a letter from 
Deputy Commissioner Charles J. Timbers, of the Wisconsin Insurance Department. Mr. 
Timbers was kind enough to read a preliminary draft of this section and, drawing upon 
his continuous experience of 42 years with the department and the Wisconsin Inspection 
Bureau, made valuable suggestions for changes, most of which are now incorporated in 
the text. Mr. Timbers is, of course, not responsible for any views expressed here. 
61 Wis. Laws 1929, J. Res. 82. 
62WIS. LEGISLATIVE INTERIM COMMITTEE ON FIRE INS. REP. (1931). Wis Laws 1931, c. 
437. 
63 J. Res. 56 A., Wis. (1943). T!he resolution failed •by a vote of 39 to 33, most of the 
opposition coming from Republicans and the support from Progressives and Democrats. 
Wis. A. J. 1241 (1943); id., at 3-7 for party affiliation. The sentiment for the probe was 
based on the spread .between premimns received and losses paid of $128 million to $52 
million in five years, thus raising clearly the issue of the meaning of "reasonable rates." 
See "Fire Insurance Rates Are Debated Before Committee," SHEBOYGAN PRESS, April 29, 
1943. 
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ing it to allied lines of insurance, providing closer supervision of 
rating bureaus, and fixing a definite rating formula limiting 
profits. This bill was defeated and the "All-Industry" bill was 
adopted, with a number of minor amendments proposed by the 
commissioner.64 The bill did not basically strengthen the Wis-
consin law, nor was it responsible for the ensuing period of rela-
tively more effective regulation of fire insurance rates. N everthe-
less, beginning soon after the 194 7 law there was a period in 
which fire insurance rate regulation was more effective. A number 
of rate hearings were held in 1948; fire statistical plans were de-
veloped and rate formulas devised. In 1950 the commissioner 
held a far-reaching hearing, which resulted in substantial revision 
of rates.65 Perhaps the most significant new factor in 1950 was 
the intervention of local government officials, who were politically 
motivated to demand lower rates. Though they were of relatively 
little help in the hearing process itself, the demand of the mayor 
of Milwaukee for lower rates in his city had much to do with 
getting the hearing called initially.66 The size of fire rate reduc-
tions was quickly caught up in political controversy, 67 and the 
policyholder's battle for lower rates was also taken up as a journal-
istic crusade.68 This combination of forces kept the matter before 
the public. Nevertheless, despite the continued pressure, fire 
insurance rate regulation was relatively ineffective after the 1950 
reduction, until late 1955. 
64 Wis. Laws 1947, c. 487. Letter from Mr. Timbers, Nov. 21, 1957. 
65 Indeed, in Wisconsin the commissioner's office urged the principle of a 2½% 
underwriting profit as compared with 5% accepted generally. In 1950 a compromise was 
reached, the companies accepting the commissioner's rate cut in return for his deletion 
from the order of any mention of the rate of underwriting profit. See, e.g., "Charges Fire 
Insurance Firms Attempting to Delay Rate Cut," CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 15, 1950; "$1,036,000 
Rate Slash is Reaffirmed," CAPITAL TIJ1rns, Aug. 30, 1950; "Fire Insurance Firms Drop 
Fight," WISCONSIN STATE J., Oct. 5, 1950; "Fire Insurance Rate Slash to Stand, Report," 
GREEN BAY PRE.55-GAZETIE, Oct. 19, 1950. The issue was still alive in 1955. See, e.g., "6% 
Insurance Margin Upheld," WISCONSIN STATE J., Jan. 14, 1956. (There was a 1% catas-
trophe reserve allowance, hence the profit margin talked about was really 5%.) It should 
also be pointed out that the percentage of profit on capital and surplus might be far 
more, because (1) the premium income might greatly exceed the capital and surplus 
invested in the ,business, and (2) the companies invested their assets and received invest-
ment income not only on capital and surplus, but also on the prepaid premimns belong-
ing to the policyholders. Hence, the 5% limitation, or even the 2½% limitation, was 
a far less stringent public control than existed on public utilities. 
66 "Fire Insurance Cut, City Aim," 'MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 2, 1950. The League of Wis-
consin Municipalities soon took up the fight, and even urged state rate making, as in 
Texas, "Lange Doubts Value of State Fire Insurance Rating Bureau," GREEN BAY PRESS-
GAZETIE, Oct. 31, 1950. See also "Fire Policies Probe Is Set," MILWAUKEE J., Feb. 8, 1951. 
67 See, e.g., "Insurance Rate Cut Far Too Small, Schmitt," CAPITAL TIMES, July 
19, 1950. 
68 By the CAPITAL TIMES of Madison. 
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From 1917 workmen's compensation insurance rating was un-
der a regime of social control even more strict than that for fire 
insurance, at least so far as the basic statute was concerned.69 
Likewise, a rating law for automobile liability insurance was 
passed in 1919.70 This law was inadequate, however, and the com-
missioner supported the passage of the casualty and surety in-
surance "All-Industry" bill in 1947.71 Outside the fire and com-
pensation fields, however, actual regulation was not effective; the 
casualty rate division was inadequately staffed and was not very 
active. It approved automobile rate filings without public hear-
ings, because of the lack of enough competent personnel in the 
division to review the statistical data.72 
From 1948 to 1950 there was a short burst of activity in super-
vision of rate making, especially in the fire insurance field; from 
1950 to 1955 enforcement lagged. In 1955 a timely vacancy in 
the commissioner's office coincided with an intemperate contro-
versy between Madison's Capital Times and the fire rating bureau 
over the question of proper rates, which resulted from approval 
of rate increases by the retiring commissioner over the protests 
of his deputy and the fire rating division. The governor then ap-
pointed to the office a vigorous commissioner, prepared to inter-
vene decisively in the public interest. As soon as he took office, 
he called a public hearing; his action resulted in an eleven percent 
reduction in fire rates, effective August 1, 1956. An additional 
six percent reduction was protested by the bureau, and at present 
writing is in litigation before the Wisconsin courts. The new 
commissioner also reorganized the Wisconsin Insurance Depart-
ment, putting all rate regulation under one division and increas-
ing the effectiveness of control. 73 
In 1957 the commissioner went even farther. He took a posi-
tion much in advance of that of insurance commissioners gen-
erally and urged enactment of a statute to give him control of 
69 Wis. Laws 1917, c. 637; in 1913 insurers were already compelled to file their rates 
and adhere to them, Wis. Laws 1913, c. 599. 
70 Wis. Laws 1919, c. 136; and see Wis. Laws 1923, c. 281. See Wis. Laws 1919, c. 
655 for surety rates. 
71 Wis. Laws 1947, c. 521. 
72 See "Fire Insurance Premiums Are $55,728,082 Greater than Losses in 3 Years," 
CAPITAL TIMES, ,May 19, 1948; "Auto Insurance Rate Hike Effective Monday," CAPITAL 
TIMES, April 15, 1948; "Have We any Regulation of Insurance Companies in Wisconsin?" 
editorial in CAPITAL TIMES, April 20, 1948; "No Hearing on Boost in Car Surety Rates,'' 
CAPITAL TIMES, Oct. 8, 1951. 
73 Letter from Deputy Commissioner Timbers, Nov. 21, 1957. WIS. !NS. Co111111R. ANN. 
REP. 7-22 (1957). 
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the rates in credit life insurance, a new and rapidly growing 
field. The 1957 Wisconsin Legislature enacted such a statute. 
In August 1957, the commissioner demanded a twenty-five per-
cent cut in credit life insurance rates.74 At this writing, it ap-
pears quite likely that some such reduction will soon be put into 
effect. There is every indication that rate regulation generally, 
in the hands of this vigorous commissioner, will be more effec-
tive in Wisconsin than heretofore.75 
It seems fair to conclude that in the middle 1950's, insurance 
rate regulation is fairly effective in Wisconsin. Immediately prior 
to this time, in the earlier years of the decade, it was much less 
adequate, especially in the casualty field, despite the great im-
portance of automobile insurance in the family budget, which 
in midcentury substantially exceeded the importance of fire in-
surance.76 The Southeastern Underwriters case and its aftermath 
did not create any sudden upsurge in regulatory activity in Wis-
consin. The sporadic development toward more effective regu-
lation continued, without a decisive break with the pre-1944 
past. Real regulation is only partially the result of improved stat-
utes. It depends, too, on the channeling of pressures, especially 
through municipal politics, in such a way as to compete effectively 
·with the highly organized insurance industry. It also depends on 
the vigor and the attitudes of incumbent commissioners. To 
what extent the aggressiveness of the present commissioner rep-
resents a trend that will last beyond his term in office, it is too 
early to .tell. To whatever extent effective regulation has not 
yet become permanently established in Wisconsin, there remains 
potential pressure for federal regulation.77 
74 "Rogan Calls for Credit Insurance Rate Regulation," CAPITAL TIMES, May 8, 1957; 
Wis. Laws 1957, c. 321, §4. 
75 "Asks Credit Insurance Rate Cut," CAPITAL TIMES, Aug. 14, 1957. 
76 Letter from Deputy Commissioner Timbers, Nov. 21, 1957. In 1955, Wisconsin 
Auto Liability premiums were $42,650,239, Auto Property Damage premiums were 
$18,374,857, and Auto Physical Damage premiums were $31,034,904, compared with Fire 
premiums of $34,576,521, and Extended Coverage premiums of $12,246,391, Wis. INs. 
COMMR. ANN. REP. 36 (1956). 
77 Missouri is a medium-sized state with a turbulent history of vigorous attempts 
to enforce anti-combination statutes, with varied results. See State v. American Ins. Co., 
355 Mo. 1053, 200 S.W. (2d) I (1946), for a review of Missouri's litigation over the question 
of rates; note, 33 GEo. L.J. 70 at 80-82 (1944); Stelzer, "The Insurance Industry and the 
Antitrust Laws," 1955 !Ns. L.J. 137. The Missouri attorney general instigated the in-
vestigation that led to the indictments in the Southeastern Undenvriters case, Joint 
Hearing before the Subcommittees of the Committees on the Judiciary on S. 1362, 
H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 25 (1943). And see id., 62-63, 82-84 (1943). 
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Utah 
In this smaller state, there is a much shorter history of rate 
regulation. In fact, it was only under the compulsion of the 
McCarran Act that rate regulatory laws were first passed in 
194 7. 78 In the years since a regulatory statute has been on the 
books of the state, there has been only one incident involving 
the justification of filed fire insurance rates, perhaps partly 
because on only this one occasion was there any substantial in-
crease in rates. The Utah Fire Rating Bureau, which is a branch 
of the Pacific Fire Rating Bureau, is the authorized filing agent 
for all but a handful of the fire carriers in the state of Utah. 
On January 22, 1954, the bureau filed new rates, effective April 
1, involving reductions in household and farm insurance rates, 
but increases in mercantile and commercial building rates. The 
new rates were voluntarily filed, and represented a net reduction 
in premiums for the state. The mercantile policyholders were 
organized in such a way as to be able to resist the raises effectively, 
and through existing trade associations the merchants brought 
pressure to bear on the state governmental machinery. On Feb-
ruary 15, the Insurance Division and its parent, the Department 
of Business Regulation, issued an order suspending the new 
rates pending a hearing to determine whether there was any 
justification for the increases in mercantile rates, and why the 
reduction was not larger for the household and farm rates. Hear-
ings were held on two different days, and the matter then was 
taken under advisement by the agency. On April 9, the bureau 
made a new filing with larger reductions for home and farm 
rates, and smaller increases for the mercantile and commercial 
risks. On request of the bureau, the department permitted the 
withdrawing of the previous filing, dismissed the hearings with 
prejudice, and accepted the new filing, effective May 1, without 
further hearing.79 
This incident, like the increased effectiveness of Wisconsin 
fire insurance rate regulation after 1950, illustrates one of the 
apparent prerequisites for effective regulation, that the pres-
sures from insurance consumers be focused so they can be felt 
78 Utah Laws, 1947, c. 63. 
79 Notice of Hearing and Order To Show Cause to Uta:h Fire Rating Bureau and 
Harold S. Morr, Manager, dated February 15, 1954; Order of Dismissal and Allowing 
of Withdrawal of Rate Filing on January 22, 1954 and Approving Filing -Made April 9, 
1954, dated April 9, 1954. 
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by insurance department officials through the political machinery 
of the state. This seems true at least when the budget and staff 
of an insurance department are inadequate. Thus no one in the 
Utah insurance department is equipped by training or experience 
critically to scrutinize filed rates and supporting statistics. As 
a result, filed rates are accepted without question except when 
pressures are sufficiently concentrated to be felt through the 
political mechanism. This is not a criticism of the department 
personnel; inadequate rate regulation is inevitable with the 
present staffing of the department. The concentration of pres-
sures for regulatory scrutiny of rates is to be expected when 
organized groups like merchants are affected, but not ordinarily 
when unorganized homeowners are involved, unless rates of 
insurance are seized upon as an issue in municipal politics, as 
has occurred in Wisconsin. As a result control may be expected 
to be haphazard, inertia being what it is in human affairs. In-
deed reductions in rates may be too large for well-organized policy-
holders, resulting either in an inadequate rate structure, or in 
discrimination against unorganized policyholders, such as home-
owners. Regular and adequate regulation seems dependent upon 
the staffing of insurance departments with trained personnel who 
develop routines for and a vested interest in the systematic han-
dling of the problem. In the absence of special pressures, the Utah 
department relies heavily upon the bureau determinations, even 
to the extent of using them as a basis for approving or rejecting 
deviations or non-bureau filings. The absence of effective regu-
lation does not mean that rates are not voluntarily reduced by 
the bureau in the light of experience, nor does it necessarily mean 
that rates are excessive, but it does mean that rates are set by a 
private body not responsible to the public, and not effectively 
regulated by a public agency. 
Even when pressures from organized groups of consumers or 
through the political mechanism do operate, they seek only to 
force down the rates of premium. More important for the long 
term welfare of the public is the maintenance of adequate rates 
of premium. Since the liighly organized insurance industry is 
vitally concerned with that problem, it is perhaps supererogatory 
for anyone else to worry about it, and yet some responsible in-
surance officials in Utah profess concern with the present ade-
quacy of fire insurance rates. This concern is less with the ade-
quacy of Utah rates than with adequacy on a national basis, 
where mounting losses, they allege, threaten widespread insol-
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vency of fire insurance companies.80 Despite this pessimism, Utah 
rates are even now under reconsideration by the bureau in the 
light of Utah experience alone, and conceivably may be reduced 
in the near future. There will undoubtedly be reluctance to 
make reductions as large as the statistics seem to warrant, how-
ever. Officials point to the fact that Utah has a very low deviation 
rate, i.e., even if the rates appear to be too high, competing com-
panies have not filed deviations to any marked degree, thus sug-
gesting a general underwriting judgment that deviations are 
not justified even in the face of apparently excessive rates. The 
companies fear quick reversal of Utah statistics, which are based 
on a small premium volume, and which may be colored by the 
fortunate absence in recent years of any major fires; they also 
anticipate frequent voluntary adjustments by the bureau to the 
extent the bureau thinks justified by the data.81 It is beyond the 
scope of this paper to reach any considered judgment on the 
complicated question whether the Utah premium rates are in-
adequate, excessive, or unfairly discriminatory. It seems, however, 
that Utah premium rates are prima fade excessive and that the 
public interest demands a far more careful scrutiny of the rates 
than they are getting. But it is not enough for the commissioner 
simply to insist loudly on rate reduction; he must do so with 
careful regard for the vital need of the industry and the policy-
holder for adequate rates. 
In other lines of insurance, regulation is less adequate than 
in fire insurance, if that be possible. The power to regulate exists 
on the books, but there has been no real control, in fact. Thus in 
January 1957, Deputy Commissioner Hanson told the press of 
an impending increase in automobile insurance rates. He is 
reported as saying that the department accepted without question 
the rates set by the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters 
and the National Automobile Underwriters Association. In Jan-
uary 1958, however, when the commissioner announced another 
sharp increase in the automobile insurance rates, public outcry 
led to consideration by the attorney general, who ruled that the 
rates were ineffective because of failure to comply with the rate 
regulation law. Thus, at this writing, a hearing seems assured 
on the merits of this latest increase. There is no real assurance, 
however, that the incident will result in institutional changes.82 
so Interviews with and letters from responsible fire insurance officials in Utah. 
Bl Ibid. 
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Ineffectiveness of regulation bears a close relation to inade-
quacy of staffs and budgets. The Utah Insurance Division expend-
itures for the year 1955 were $32,581.79, of which $3603.29 were 
central administration expenses of the parent Department of 
Business Regulation chargeable to the Insurance Division. Person-
al services in the department cost only $23,020.00. The inadequacy 
of rate (and other insurance) regulation cannot be attributed 
to the poverty of the state, however, for the department collected 
in fees a total of $93,637.13 for the services rendered by the staff. 
The Insurance Division thus makes a profit for the state of Utah 
of over $60,000 out of the fees collected to pay for the depart-
ment's services, in addition to one and two-thirds millions of 
dollars of premium tax collections intended for the general fund. 
The department's budget must be at least tripled before the 
state can justifiably plead poverty as an excuse for failure ade-
quately. to regulate insurance.83 
In Wisconsin the department's budget was about $200,000 
in the same year, yet it would be hard to regard even Wisconsin's 
rate regulation as fully adequate.84 
It seems fair to state on the basis of the data presented above 
that there are states in which rate regulation in the insurance 
field can hardly be regarded as adequate, if by "adequate" we 
mean that public officials actually scrutinize and either approve, 
or, with knowledge of the facts, fail to disapprove the rates filed 
by rating bureaus. Of course the "All-Industry" laws do give to 
all commissioners the power to regulate, and when specific pres-
sures are applied to the state's political machinery, there may 
be specific acts of regulation. But systematic and constant surveil-
lance over rates is lacking in some states. In other states there 
is reasonably adequate regulation in some lines of insurance, but 
not in other lines. And finally, there may be a few states where 
regulation is real, effective and complete.85 
82 "Car Owners Face Insurance Rate Jump," SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 16, 1957. 
"Legality Clouds Rate Hike on Auto Insurance," and editorial, "Public Entitled to Proof 
on Rate Boost," SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 1958; "Car Insurance Boost Ruled Not In 
Effect," and editorial, "Increasing Your Car Insurance," DESERET NEWS, Jan. 22, 1958; 
"Insurance Boost Illegal, State Attorney Decides," SALT LAKE TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 1958. 
83 UTAH !NS. COMMR. ANN. REP. 98 (1956). 
84 WIS. INs. COMMR. ANN. REP. 8 (1956). And see p. 561 supra. 
85 If the amount spent for insurance department salaries is regarded as some indica-
tion of the presence of qualified personnel for rate regulation, Vermont, with $15,510.23, 
North Dakota, with $28,656.92, Idaho with $24,992.90, can hardly have adequate rate 
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MEANING oF THE McCARRAN-FERGusoN AcT 
We now have some indication of "the extent to which [the 
insurance] business is ... regulated by State law." It remains to 
inquire what indications there may be as to the future course of 
public control of insurance rate making. 
Public policy with respect to the insurance business was not 
clearly defined before 1945. The relatively naive trust-busting 
policy of the Sherman Act was in effect in some states. This 
policy assumed that combinations were per se bad, and sought to 
forbid them. A more sophisticated policy was manifest in those 
state statutes which permitted or encouraged rate making com-
binations, but sought to bring them under public control. The 
latter clearly represented the historical trend; it was more realis-
tic in seeing the dangers of unrestrained competition as well as 
of uncontrolled combination. 
The McCarran-Ferguson Act recognized the merits of this 
kind of discriminating control, as opposed to the inflexible policy 
of the Sherman Act. It encouraged the states to regulate more 
adequately, but reserved some degree of £ederal control by 
making the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission 
Acts applicable to the insurance business "to the extent that such 
business is not regulated by State law." The historical contribu-
tion of the McCarran Act thus seems to be the formulation of 
a federal public policy that real regulation of insurance rate 
making at the state level is preferable to the enforcement of a 
non-regulatory federal anti-combination policy, but that the latter 
is preferable to unregulated rate making by combinations of 
insurers. Thus, the Judiciary Committees of both House and 
Senate stated that "the Congress proposes by this bill to secure 
adequate regulation and control of the insurance business."86 
An obvious question arises: is the All-Industry bill the kind 
regulation. Wyoming's total department expenditures were $35,644.03 (including the 
Inheritance Taxes Department and the State Fire Marshal); South Dakota, $40,123.04; 
New Hampshire, $52,307.65. The probability is high that some of these states, perhaps 
all, have grossly inadequate rate regulation. Even states with adequate insurance depart-
ment budgets may have inadequate regulation of rates for other reasons. The figures 
above came from annual reports that were at •hand. They are not in all cases the most 
recent figures and they are not always strictly comparable, but they sufficiently make 
the point. ,Marryott, "Twelve Years of Insurance as Commerce-Prospects for the Future," 
24 lNs. COUNSEL J. 191 (1957), throws some light on the adequacy of state rate regulation 
from the company standpoint. 
86 H. Rep. 143, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 2 (1945); S. Rep. 20, 79th Cong., 1st sess., 2 (1945). 
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of regulation "by State law" that excludes the operation of the 
stipulated federal acts, in cases where in fact the commissioner 
lacks the staff, or the budget, or the talent, or the disposition, to 
do a real job of regulating. The answer turns on the meaning 
attributed to the word "regulate." 
Two views have been vigorously espoused: one is that the 
passage of legislation is the only kind of "regulation" necessary 
to satisfy the proviso of section 2(b),87 while the other is that only 
active regulation under the statute will satisfy the proviso.88 
Strong arguments can be made for both views. 
The most persuasive argument that the enactment of a statute 
alone is sufficient to satisfy the proviso would seem to rest upon 
the probable reluctance of the federal courts to take on the 
task of ascertaining when there is "regulation." How can the 
court say that there is not regulation, when the statute gives 
to some public official the power to review rates and disapprove 
them? What standards are to be set up to determine when "pow-
er" becomes "regulation"? Must the statute require the commis-
sioner actually to approve filed rates, or is it sufficient to give him 
power to disapprove, if he wishes, rates "deemed" approved a 
specified time after filing? Must there be prosecutions under the 
statute, or orders by the commissioner to reduce or reconsider 
rates or change classifications? Must there be a functionary in 
the insurance department qualified by training or experience to 
understand the rate making process? Or is it enough that someone 
be assigned the responsibility of reviewing rates? The require-
ment that regulation be real in order to exclude federal control 
puts an impossible burden on the court-so goes the argument. 
Rather than accept the burden, the court will interpret the 
proviso as being satisfied by the mere enactment of legislation. 
It is doubtful, of course, whether the task the court would have 
under the interpretation demanding adequate regulation is any 
more difficult than a multitude of problems the court solves 
regularly. 
If the statute is interpreted as requiring more than mere 
87'E.g., Orfield, "Improving State Regulation of Insurance," 32 MINN. L. REv. 219 at 
224 (1948). 
ss E.g., Raymond Harris, Deputy Superintendent and Counsel, New York State In-
surance Department: "While the court may not undertake to substitute its judgment for 
that of the insurance commissioner in deciding whether state laws should be invoked in 
a particular case, it is hardly likely that the court, in interpreting Public Law 15, would 
accept formal •legislative action as complying with the act." 4 NEW YoRK STATE INS. DEPT., 
EXAMINATION OF INS. COMPANIES 19 (1954). 
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enactment of regulatory statutes by the states in order to exclude 
the application of the federal antitrust laws, it might be plausibly 
argued, though probably not successfully, that the Sherman Act 
as thus applied would be unconstitutional for vagueness. How 
could insurance companies and rating bureaus be sure when the 
states in which they operated were regulating enough to satisfy 
the proviso? To determine in advance whether they were com-
plying with the law would be very difficult, and the variable factor 
would not even be within their control. In 1920 the Supreme 
Court struck down provisions of the Lever Act making it un-
lawful willfully "to make any unjust or unreasonable rate or 
charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries," on 
the ground that the act created no ascertainable standard of 
guilt.89 In 1946, on the other hand, the Court upheld against the 
same challenge a statute forbidding coercion of a radio broad-
caster to employ persons "in excess of the number ... needed."90 
It seems doubtful if the present Court would invalidate for in-
definiteness this statute dealing with economic regulation, at 
least as applied to those clear cases where the state did not in 
fact regulate at all. The doctrine is based on a constitutional re-
quirement of notice, described by the Court in the Petrillo case: 
"The language here challenged conveys sufficiently definite warn-
ing as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common un-
derstanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more."91 
The statute in the present case seems to meet this test. Moreover, 
here the indefiniteness is not in the prohibition itself, but in an 
exception to the prohibition in favor of the defendant. Finally, 
even if it were held unconstitutional if sanctioned by an indict-
ment, it might not be for purposes of a cease and desist order, 
which makes the statute more definite prospectively, and does 
not punish prior violations of the statute alone.92 Although tii.e 
argument to the constitutionality of the Sherman Act as thus ap-
plied is not absurd, it does not seem likely to convince the Court. 
On the other hand, the word "regulate" usually connotes 
89 United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921). But compare Screws v. 
United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), where Justice Douglas, speaking for the Court, created 
a requirement of specific intent and thereby overcame ,the vagueness of a statute punish-
ing deprivation of constitutional rights. 
90 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I (1947). And see Gorin v. United States, 312 
U.S. 19 (1941). 
91 United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. I at 8 (1947). 
92 For a general discussion of the problem of indefiniteness, see comment, 53 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 264 (1954). 
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something more active than mere paper machinery. Webster 
defines "regulate" as "to govern or direct according to rule ... ; 
more narrowly, to bring under the control of law or constituted 
authority .... " The Oxford Universal Dictionary adds the notion, 
"to subject to guidance or restriction .... " Both suggest affirma-
tively enforcing policy-not merely stating it. The word "regu-
late" thus seems more consistent with a requirement of meaning-
ful regulation than with mere legislation.93 
Litigated cases give relatively little help in determining the 
meaning of "regulate." Nearly always they were concerned to 
delimit the outer boundaries of power to regulate, not to deter-
mine the minimal connotations of the word. Nevertheless, there 
is language in some cases contrasting regulation with legislation. 
Thus, "the word 'laws' . . . is therein definitely related to the 
legislature or to the legislative power, while the word 'regulate' 
and kindred words are attributed to the adminstrative power 
and duty."94 Again, "regulation and legislation are not synony-
mous terms. As applied to the statute in question, regulation 
means a reasonable supervision by a legislative authorized agen-
cy .... " 95 Since the questions litigated were not germane to the 
present problem, this language is hardly conclusive, but it does 
suggest that "regulation" ordinarily means more than "legis-
lation." 
Only one case arguably deals with the precise issue before 
us. In North Little Rock Transportation Co. v. Casualty Recipro-
cal Exchange,96 the Eighth Circuit upheld a summary judgment 
of dismissal of a policyholder's action for treble damages under the 
Sherman Act. The fact that the State of Arkansas had enacted 
93 WEBSTER, NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 2d ed., 2099 (1934); OXFORD UNIVERSAL 
DICTIONARY, 3d ed., revised with addenda, 1692 (1955). 
94'Marsh v. Bartlett, 343 Mo. 526 at 540, 121 S.W. (2d) 737 (1938). 
95 In re Northwestern Indiana Telephone Co., 201 Ind. 667 at 680, 171 N.E. 65 
(1930). And see United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), where on a question 
of the validity of delegated power, the Court talks of regulation as an aspect of the ad-
ministrative process. 
96 (8th Cir. 1950) 181 F. (2d) 174, cert. den. 340 U.S. 823 (1950). National Cas. Co. v. 
FTC, (6th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 883, cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 119 (1957), deals tangentially 
with the analogous problem of the applicability of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 
Since the commission was reaching for jurisdiction over the interstate advertising of mail 
order insurers, irrespective of state regulation, the case does not deal directly with the 
question of jurisdiction where there was legislation but no regulation in fact. For a 
statement of this proposition, see Brief for the F.T.C. at 28. For present purposes, the 
case seems to suffer from the same infirmity as the North Little Rock case. As the United 
States Supreme Court has granted certiorari, :however, its opinion may throw some light 
on the problem before us. See also note, 60 YALE L. J. 160 (1951). 
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rate regulatory legislation under the McCarran Act insulated the 
bureau and company from civil liability under the Sherman 
Act. The court did not inquire beyond the fact that there was 
legislation, but apparently the argument that inadequacy of reg-
ulation might bring the Sherman Act into operation was not 
made to the court. The case thus seems indecisive on this ques-
tion. 
There is no "plain meaning" of the word "regulate." It 
seems appropriate, therefore, to bring in legislative history as an 
aid to interpretation. 
Pending the enactment of the McCarran Act, Senator Rad-
cliffe of Maryland exchanged a number of letters with President 
Roosevelt, who made it clear that the administration was not 
seeking federal regulation of insurance. He thought there was 
"no conflict between the application of the antitrust laws and 
effective State regulation of insurance companies, and there is 
no valid reason for giving any special exemption from the anti-
trust laws to the business of insurance. The antitrust laws pro-
hibit private rate fixing arrangements between insurance com-
panies and acts of boycott, coercion, or intimidation. The anti-
trust laws do not conflict with affirmative regulation of insurance 
by the States such as agreed insurance rates if they are affirma-
tively approved by State offi.cials."97 In signing the bill he said: 
"After the moratorium period, the antitrust laws ... will be ap-
plicable . . . except to the extent that the states have assumed the 
responsibility, and are effectively performing that responsibil-
ity .... "98 The day after he signed the act, the President said: 
"Congress did not intend to permit private rate fixing, which the 
Antitrust Act forbids, but was willing to permit actual regulation 
of rates by affirmative action of the states."99 Although what 
the President said is hardly decisive as to the meaning of the act, 
the strong leadership Roosevelt exercised in Congress gives his 
intentions weight in providing background. 
Attorney General Biddle also spoke for the administration: 
". . . The view we hold toward insurance is not unlike our policy 
toward railroad rates, that the fixing of rates by private groups ... 
without active and definite state approval~ is a clear contravention, 
97 91 CONG. R.Ec. 482 (1945). Italics added. 
98 Mimeographed White House release, March 10, 1945, as quoted in Layne, "Multiple 
State Regulation of Mail Order Insurance," 39 GEo. L. J. 422 at 425, n. 10 (1951). A weaker 
version of the release is quoted in SAWYER, INSURANCE As INTERSTATE COMMERCE 66 (1945). 
99 As quoted in ABA SECTION OF INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 105 (1946). 
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not only of the [Sherman] act, but of the whole theory that un-
derlies the act, the theory that competition should be free unless 
it is specifically regulated by the appropriate body."100 These 
comments from the administration emphasize the need for af-
firmative regulation, as opposed to the application of the usual 
"deemer" clause, that rates are "deemed" approved unless disap-
proved within a specified time. The deemer clause tends to emas-
culate control by the commissioner.101 The requirement of af-
firmative approval seems crucial in Mr. Biddle's view; he thought 
statutes containing the deemer clause would not satisfy the re-
quirements of the McCarran Act.102 
The bill was introduced in the Senate on January 18, 1945.103 
The President signed it less than two months later. This hasty 
action attests the sense of urgency that was felt. Brevity of con-
sideration made difficult the clear isolation of the issues involved, 
and a wide variety of expressions are to be found in the Con-
gressional Record as to the intent of the Congress. The basic 
purposes of the bill were to preserve to the states the power to 
regulate but to compel them to regulate more adequately. The 
method was to permit to the states a moratorium within which 
to set up the regulatory machinery. Senator Ferguson of Michi-
gan thought the bill would permit the states to pass laws in conflict 
with the Sherman Act during the moratorium, but Senators M ur-
dock of Utah and O'Mahoney of Wyoming objected to any form of 
the bill that would permit the states to authorize monopolies. 
They sought to delete section 2(b), which provided that "No act of 
Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede 
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the 
business of insurance . . . unless such act specifically so pro-
vides. "104 The Senate then amended section 2(b) to provide that 
"No act . . . except the . . . Sherman Act, and/ or . . . the Clayton 
100 Quoted in Dineen, "The Rating Problem," ABA SECTION OF INS. LAW PROCEEDINGS 
104 at 105 (1946). He also said: "I think there is no doubt at all that insurance rates 
which are approved by a state are not subject to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. By that 
I mean that if a group of insurance companies agreed on rates and filed them with a 
state commission or state body, and that body took active and definite action, made active 
and definite approval of those rates, in that case I think the matter would not be involved 
at all in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act." Ibid. 
101 Id. at 107. 
102 See Joint Hearing Before the Sub-Committees of the Committees on the Judiciary 
on S. 1362, H.R. 3269, and H.R. 3270, Pt. 6, 78th Cong., 2d sess., 638 (1944). And see note, 
96 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 223 at 230 (1947). 
103 91 CoNG. REc. 330 (1945). 
104 ld. at 478-483. 
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Act" should apply to the insurance business unless specifically 
made applicable thereto.105 Thus, after the moratorium, rate 
making combinations would be forbidden and the Sherman Act 
policy would be paramount in the insurance field. As Senator 
O'Mahoney expressed it, "There is no purpose to issue an invi-
tation from the United States Senate to the States to enact laws 
which would establish monopolies in this business."106 In the 
House, however, the bill was enacted in its original form, with-
out the Senate amendment.107 This version would make the 
Sherman and Clayton Acts permanently inapplicable to insur-
ance. On motion of Senator McCarran of Nevada, the Senate 
refused to accede to the House version, and the bill went to a 
conference committee consisting of Senators McCarran, Fer-
guson, O'Mahoney, and Representatives Sumners, Walter, and 
Hancock. The committee unanimously agreed on the conference 
form of the bill. To section 2(b) as found in the House version 
was added the proviso that after the moratorium the Sherman, 
Clayton, and Federal Trade Commission Acts should "be ap-
plicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such 
business is not regulated by state law." This gave to the federal 
antitrust legislation some restricted application to insurance after 
the moratorium.108 
The Senate debated the conference committee report on Feb-
ruary 26,109 and there were expressions indicating that two of 
the Senate conferees thought real regulation was required by the 
proviso. The following colloquy took place on that day: 
Senator Ferguson: " ... insofar as the State is concerned 
which has specifically legislated on the subject, the three acts 
shall not apply." 
Senator O' Mahoney: "I believe the Senator from Michi-
gan went a little further than was his intention when he 
said that if the States have legislated certain things will take 
place. The bill says if the States have regulated." (Italics 
added.) 
Senator McCarran's view is very important for he introduced 
the bill and was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
105 Id. at 487, 488. 
106 Id. at 488. 
101 Id. at 1085. 
108 Id. at 1208, 1274, 1357. This form was a compromise between Senate and House 
versions. See Senator Murdock, id. at 1481-1482. 
109 Id. at 1442-1444. 
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responsible for it. To Senator Murdock's question whether Sena-
tor White of Maine thought the Congress must act affirmatively 
to occupy the field beyond the scope of state regulation, Senator 
White replied: 
"Not at all; that is not my view of the matter at all. My 
view is that the State may regulate. If, however, the State 
goes only to the point indicated,110 then these Federal stat-
utes apply throughout the whole field beyond the scope of 
the State's activity." 
Senator McCarran: "That is a correct statement." 
Senator Murdock: "Without any subsequent action on 
the part of Congress?" 
Senator White: "Without any subsequent action on the 
part of Congress." 
Senator Barkley (Kentucky): "I should like to ask, in this 
connection, whether, where States attempt to occupy the 
field-but do it inadequately-by going through the form of 
legislation so as to deprive the Clayton Act, the Sherman 
Act; and the other acts of their jurisdiction, it is the Sena-
tor's interpretation of the conference report that in a case 
of that kind, where the legislature fails adequately even to 
deal with the field it attempts to cover, these acts still would 
apply?" 
Senator McCarran: "That is my interpretation." 
Senator Pepper of Florida then objected to the conference 
report bill because he thought it "practically destroys the effect 
of the Supreme Court decision, and I am against that .... " 
Senator McCarran: "The Senator is correct regarding the 
3-year moratorium, but beyond that he is in error." 
Senator McCarran subsequently changed his position. In a 
letter to the Yale Law ] ournal, he said, " ... the intent of the Act 
was not to accomplish any particular degree of stringency of 
regulation, but to keep regulation at the State level, and forestall 
110 The words "point indicated" have no clear antecedent in the language contained 
in the preceding speeches. From context it seems to mean "enacting :but not enforcing 
regulatory legislation." See last sentence of Senator Pepper's last preceding speech, id. at 
1444, col. 2. 
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Federal regulation .... " On the other hand he contemplated 
that the legislation must meet certain minimum standards to satis-
fy the proviso. Once these minimum requirements were met, the 
adequacy of state regulation was a matter of legislative and not 
of judicial concern.111 
It must be conceded that the language in the debates, while 
suggesting the automatic application of federal antitrust laws if 
there was only paper regulation by the states, is not definitive, 
largely because it is not often clear whether the Senators were 
talking about the adequacy of the scope of the legislation, or about 
the adequacy of enforcement of legislation which was adequate in 
scope. Nor were the Senators always clear whether under the 
statute the states would be able to authorize rate bureaus, in 
contravention of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Some Senators 
were even concerned lest the passing of the act estop them from 
voting later to subject insurance companies to the federal antitrust 
laws. 
At the insistence of Senator Pepper, the matter was put over 
until February 27. He then bitterly opposed the bill on the 
ground that the conference compromise enabled the states to 
evade federal antitrust legislation by mere paper regulation. As 
a result of his speech, or perhaps as a result of second thought 
about the matter, Senators Ferguson, Murdock, and O'Mahoney 
all seemed to feel it was for Congress to decide whether the state 
regulation was such that the proviso should come into operation, 
at least if there was legislation by the state at all.112 This shift in 
expressed intentions between February 26 and 27 should not 
change the meaning of the conference bill. The earlier expres-
sions by the conferees seem most likely to reflect accurately the 
intentions of the conference committee. 
It is not necessary here definitively to ascertain the meaning 
of "regulate" in the proviso of section 2(b). For present purposes 
it is sufficient that there be a reasonable case for the proposition 
that the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade 
Commission Act are applicable to the business of insurance when 
111 Letter to Yale Law Journal, quoted in note, 60 YALE L. J. 160 at 163, note 11 
(1951); McCarran, "Federal Control of Insurance," 34 A.B.A.J. 539 at 542 (1948); McCarran, 
"Insurance as Commerce-After Four Years," 23 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 299 at 306 (1948). 
112 91 CONG. REc. 1477-1482 (1945). Senator 1Murdock urged that the states be given 
a chance: " ... "Why not be willing to have confidence that the States will do a good job 
when they step into it?" 
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there is legislation on the books but no regulation in fact. The 
authors think that the case is reasonable; many other persons 
have supported it less equivocally.113 
Even if it be conceded that the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal 
Trade Commission Acts are not automatically applicable to in-
surance if state regulation is not adequate, it at least seems clear 
that Congress intended when it passed the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act to re-examine the situation and legislate if necessary to bring 
insurance rate making under suitable public control. A theory 
of automatic application shows even more clearly the concern of 
Congress that there be effective state regulation.114 This concern 
continued. Thus Senator McCarran wrote in 1948: "There is a 
growing feeling in the Congress that the Federal legislature has 
a positive responsibility to see to it that there is adequate regu-
lation of insurance, by the laws of the several States, or by the 
act of the industry itself, promulgated into law by the legislatures 
of the States, if possible; and otherwise, by Federal laws enacted 
by the Congress." He urged the industry to examine the adequacy 
of state regulation: "Such re-examination is an obligation of the 
industry, for while the final decision with respect to adequacy 
will not be, necessarily, for the industry to make, the results of 
a final judgment of inadequacy will be the industry's to bear."115 
Senator O'Mahoney said in the Senate debate on the bill: "I 
interpret that to be a clear statement that if the States do p.ot 
regulate, the power of Congress to regulate is clearly enunciated. 
I do not conceive this to be a grant of power to the States to au-
113 See Dineen, "The Rating Problem," ABA SECTION OF INs. LAw PROCEEDINGS 104 
at 109-110 (1946); Berge, "Insurance and the Anti-Trust Laws," ABA SECTION OF !Ns. LAW 
PROCEEDINGS 29 at 34 (1946-1947). At present writing, the extent of the Federal Trade 
Commission's jurisdiction over accident and health insurance advertising under the proviso 
in section 2(b) of the McCarran Act is a much discussed problem, and the result is un-
certain. See McCarter, "Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail-Order Accident and Health 
Insurance Policies and Advertising." 1956 lNs. L. J. 247 at 260; note, 45 GEO. L. J. 85 
(1956); American Hospital and Life Ins. Co. v. FTC, (5th Cir. 1957) 243 F. (2d) 719, 
cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 120 (1957); Crafts v. FTC, (9th Cir. 1957) 244 F. (2d) 882; National 
Cas. Co. v. FTC, (6th Cir. 1957) 245 F. (2d) 883, cert. granted 78 S. Ct. 119 (1957). 
114 See Dineen, "T:he Rating Problem," ABA SEcrroN OF INS. LAw PROCEEDINGS 104 
at 110 (1946); Sawyer, "A Program Under Public Law 15," ABA SECTION OF INs. LAw 
PROCEEDINGS 115 at 118 (1946). And see Beach, "The Southeastern Underwriters Decision 
and Its Effect," 1947 WIS. L. REv. 321 at 327; Murphy, "Insurance Under the Commerce 
Clause," 33 IOWA L. REV. 91 at 94 (1947). 
115 McCarran, "Insurance as Commerce-After Four Years," 23 NoTRE DAME LAWYER 
299 at 308 (1948); and see McCarran, "Federal Control of Insurance," 34 A.B.A.J. 539 
at 540-541 (1948); 'McCarran, "Congress and Federal Regulation of Insurance," ABA 
SECTION OF INs. LAw PROCEEDINGS 29 at 33 (1947-1948). 
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thorize by permissive legislation obviously adverse combinations 
which would be against the public interest."116 Subsequently, 
he reaffirmed that position: "It will not be sufficient . . . merely 
to announce the principle or to pass laws in the several States 
which merely formally assert state authority. If there is to be state 
regulation, the States must have insurance departments which are 
competent to regulate, that is to say, which are competent to ex-
amine, audit, and understand the complexities of the insurance 
business."117 Thus, if it does not show that the Sherman, Clayton, 
and Federal Trade Commission Acts are automatically applicable 
to insurance in the event state regulation is inadequate, the legis-
lative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act at least clearly shows 
that it is the public policy of the United States that insurance 
rate making be adequately regulated, preferably by the states, 
but if not by the states then by the federal government. 
CONCLUSION 
If it be concluded, as the foregoing analysis suggests may be 
permissible, that insurance rate making will eventually be regu-
lated effectively, by the federal government if not by the states, 
and if it be concluded that state regulation is, as yet, inadequate 
in many of the states, 118 it follows that the long-term danger of 
a federal assumption of regulatory power over insurance is real. 
Unless state regulation is sufficiently stringent to prevent the 
development of substantial and organized consumer pressures, an 
attitude favorable to federal intervention may develop, or federal 
agencies may have excuse to expand the scope of their operations 
into the insurance field. It is at least possible that the Department 
of Justice might successfully assert federal power under existing 
law, where state rate. regulation is nominal. It already has taken 
116 91 CONG. REc. 1444 (1945); in the Southeastern Underwriters case, Justice Jackson 
said: "I have little doubt •that if the present trend continues federal regulation will 
eventually supersede that of the states." 322 U.S. 533 at 586 (1944). See also Patterson, 
"The Future of State Supervision of Insurance," ABA SECTION OF lNs. LAw PROCEEDINGS 
18 at 26 (1944-1945). 
117 Address ·before New York Insurance Federation, Dec. 5, 1945, quoted in I RICH-
ARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 190, n. 3a (1952). 
118 See Dineen (New York Insurance Superintendent), "The Rating Problem," ABA 
SECTION ON INSURANCE LAw PROCEEDINGS 104 at 105 (1946), pointing out the inadequacies 
of staff and the necessity of increased ·budgets and better personnel in order •to do the 
job required. · 
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action against concerted activity thought to offend the Sherman 
Act prohibition against coercion, boycott, and intimidation, and 
is therefore watchful of insurance practices and could easily as-
sume broader power.119 The Federal Trade Commission has al-
ready asserted jurisdiction over insurance companies in the acci-
dent and health field to an extent which is thought by the com-
panies and the circuit courts of appeals to exceed its power 
under the act.120 However, the United States Supreme Court has 
just granted certiorari in two of the cases circumscribing the 
commission's power and the whole matter must be regarded as 
undecided. It is even more likely that a reforming Congress may 
step in and fill up the power vacuum left by the states, if the 
consumer demand for regulation is not fully satisfied by state 
action. It may be concluded, therefore, that the minimum con-
dition for the sure preservation of state regulatory power over 
the insurance business is not now fully satisfied. While it would 
be extremely rash to predict the exact course events will take, 
or even to asseverate that state regulation is inevitably doomed, 
there is a real possibility that the federal government will enter 
the field of insurance, and that its entrance will lead eventually to 
total occupation of the field, and conceivably also to appropria-
tion by the federal government of the substantial insurance tax 
revenues which now go largely to the states. In light of this 
danger, continuance of penny-wise policies of economy in budget 
and staff for insurance departments may in the end prove to be 
pound-foolish. If the states cannot do an adequate job, perhaps 
a federal commissioner of insurance can. If effective regulation 
is too expensive for some small states, the way is open for regional 
cooperation in the regulation of rates. The possibility of inter-
state cooperative use of technical facilities and personnel is al-
ready provided by many statutes.121 Indeed, interstate rating may 
be desirable to produce a large enough premium volume in all 
classifications of risks to give credibility to the rate structure.122 
119 See United States v. Insurance Board of Cleveland, (N.D. Ohio 1956) 144 F. Supp. 
684, where pressure from the Justice Department seemed to have compelled the bureau 
to terminate a number of restrictive practices. See also United States v. New Orleans 
Ins. Exch., (E.D. La. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 915. 
120 See note, 45 GEO. L. J. 85 (1956); note, 5 J. PUBLIC I.Aw 494 (1956); and see note 
113 supra. 
121See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. (1953) §31-2-14; 1 RICHARDS, INSURANCE, 5th ed., 295 
(1952). 
122 T:he extreme difficulty in computing a reliable rate structure in a small state may 
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Interstate rating and regulation of rates would make possible 
more adequate supervision within the reach of small state budgets. 
The long history of cooperation through the National Association 
of Insurance Commissioners provides an avenue for the solution 
of the problem, if the states really wish to preserve permanently 
their preeminence in the regulation and taxation of insurance. 
be seen in the memorandum opinion in Matter of Idaho Surveying and Rating Bu-
reau, in the Third Judicial District Court of Idaho, Civil Case No. 25750 (1955). The 
trial brief of Petitioner (the Bureau) is an excellent explanation of the way in which 
fire rates are made. See also Kulp, "The Rate0Making Process in Property and Casualty 
Insurance-Goals, Technics and Limits," 15 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 493 at 503-506 (1950). 
And see Harrington (Insurance Commissioner of Massachusetts), "Administration of 
Insurance Rate !Regulatory Laws," 15 LAW AND CONTEM. PROB. 597 at 602 (1950). 
